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BRITISH CIAPITBL, THE BRITISH STATE AM) 
ECONOMIC INVESTMENll IN SOTJ'I!H LFFiICA, 1886-1914 
by 
J. J. van Helten 
We would argue that at least one important reason w h y  
Britain went to war was to establish a modern polity 
in South Africa, one which would provide the necessary 
infrastructure for the maintenance and development of 
crucial British economic interests. 
S. Marks and A. Atmore (1) 
... forms of state are to be grasped neither from 
themselves nor from the so-called general development 
of the human mind but rather have their roots in the 
material conditions of life. 
Karl Marx f 2) 
Introduction 
By "material conditions of life1', Ham really meant the modes of production. As such 
any analysis of the state, and certainly of an interventionist state like Britain in 
Southern Africa, must be based on an examination of the specific capitalist mode of 
production, its appropriation of surplus value and resulting laws of reproduction of 
the whole social formation which, in the first place, gave rise,to the particular 
political form. 
In capitalist society, the straightforward appropriation of surplus value 
and the concomitant preservation of the social structure do not depend on direct 
relations of force, nor do they depend on the repressive force of ideology, thou& 
the latter's impact in the case of race relations in South Africa must not be under- 
estimated. Instead, they rely on the operation of the laws of reproduction. However, 
the very process of social reproduction and appropriation of the surplus product by 
the ruling class requires the removal or abolition of all restraints, i.e. fewblism, 
etc., which might impede the establishment of direct relations of control between the 
owners of the means of production and the labour force. A capitalist form of society 
will remove these barriers or restraints and organize the manner in which social 
labour is distributed and surplus produce appropriated; as part of this historical 
development, however, the direct producers are effectively deprived of control over 
the direct physical means of force, and this means is now located in a social 
instance raised above the economic reproduction process itself - namely the bourgcrois 
state. 
The bourgeois state not only concerns itself with using force internally 
against the working class in order to maintain the process of accumulation, but it 
will also use it externally, especially as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall 
forces capital to seek investment outlets abroad under the protective aegis of the 
state. This function of the state can be performed objectively only outside the sphere 
of influence of individual capitals, but means that the function of the state can never 
really be more than the creation of "e~ternal~~ or infrastructural conditions for the 
social reproduction process, which regulates itself on the basis of the law of value. 
i In other words, the social process of production and reproduction cannot itself be an object of state activity, for it is determined solely by the laws and development of 
the process of reproduction. (3) 
1 Within the context of South Africa between 1886 and 1914, Britain was obliged 
to create for British capital the necessary "externalff conditions of reproduction, for 
1 these had been stifled by the activities of the feudalist Boer state. The general 
I necessity of British state interventionism resulted directly from the fact that the 
capitalist process of reproduction presupposed certain social functions which could 
l 
not be fulfilled by individual capitals, because of both constraints and structural 
l problems within the mining industry in particular and the fact that capital's limited profit interest prevented it from creating its own infrastructural prerequisites of 
production. Incidentally, this paper will show that German capital also managed to 
l mobilize the state, albeit initially, with less impact than British capital. 
l 
I The contradictions in the process of accumulation, which gave rise, amongst 
other things, to clashes between individual capitals and groups of capital, are 
reflected, in part, in the apparent inconsistencies in the mode and appearance of 
state activity. In particular, the bourgeois state's form as an instance above the 
melee of economic reproduction is continually interrupted by the need to use force (the 
I Boer war), intervene indirectly (~itlanders, dynamite monopoly, etc.), or to be l 
I associated openly with one section or another of capital (mining, commercial-industrial). 
l There is no incongruity in this, however; the concrete activities of the state, which I 
1 are implicit in the form of the "pwticularizationV of the bourgeois state, are the 
direct result of clashes of interests and pressure exerted by capital over time. The 
function of the state is not the result of an abstract instance but of a historical 
l process of capitalist development incorporating and reflecting all these separate l 
interests and pressures. Indeed, the bourgeois state as an instance above the direct 
production process can only really maintain its form if the process of reproduction of 
I capital as a whole is guaranteed and its own material basis thus secured. 
l 
The SA. and the Mining Industry 
l In 1898, barely twelve years after the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand, 
the Transvaal was producing 27.5 per cent of the world's output of gold. (4) This rapid 
I development had been due to the mining industry's ability to structure itself in such a 
I wag as to cut costs and maximize output. The geological nature of the gold-bearing reef 
had made it essential from the very start that mining operations be conducted along 
I highly centralized lines: the vast initial capital outlay needed to develop the mines 
! had pushed the smallest claims holders out and had led to the development of the so- called "Group" system, which rationalized the production process and helped to stabilize 
i capital investment. While this administrative rationalization did offset some of the constraints imposed by the low-grade nature of the reef, general labour and overhead 
costs severely limited management's freedom of action in relation to overall 
profitability. (5) Generally speaking, profit maximization could not be attained 
without continued and substantial capital outlays and a hi& minimum level of output. 
Moreover, the internationally fixed price of gold meant that increased production costs 
could not be passed on to consumers and that the industry was very vulnerable to cost 
inflation. 
While the ffGroup" system enabled the mining industry to tap the resources of 
international capital, the process of capital accumulation on the Rand itself operated 
l 
under severe constraints inherent in its operational structure. The minimization of 
costs, in particular, could only really be effected by the state through the 
provision of the general material conditions of production. Yet the Boer state had 
neither the political inclination nor, more importantly, the resources to provide 
these conditions. 
By virtue of its administrative inefficiency the I(ruger regime was unable to 
enforce and police the pass laws, cut down on gold thefts or prohibit the liquor 
traffic. (6) The mining industry's own attempts at establishing a monopsonistic control 
over African labour could not function effectively without active state participation. 
Wages formed about 69 per cent of the industry's annual working costs and half of the 
total wages bill went to the African labour force of some 40,000. (7) Labour turnover 
was high and recruitment was expensive but the pass regulations, which the Chamber of 
Mines regarded as an integral part of their attempts to cut costs on the wages front, 
had not even been officially proclaimed as late as 1895. (8) Needless to say that, 
while all mines suffered from the scarcity of African labour, the deep level mines, 
whose development only took off in 1895, suffered more as cheap labour could be offset 
against their hi&er cost structure. 
The supply of African labour for the mines, however, was not the only bone 
of contention between the I(irugerite state and mining capital: 
the burden from which relief is most urgently required 
is the heavy cost, uncertainty and delay of transport 
caused by the absence of railways ... The sum paid 
during the year 1889 by the Witwatersrand district 
alone for the carriage of goods, exclusive of produce 
from the coast, is estimated at £2,750,000. The cost l 
of importing the same goods by railway fron the coast 
to Johannesburg would be £1,150,000. Thus an actual 
loss of £1,600,000 was borne by the fields in a single 
year* (9) 
Once the railways did reach the Rand, however, the NZASM, or Netherlands South African 
Railway Company, which held the railway monopoly in the Transvaal, levied very high 
frei&t rates on imported materials, foodstuffs, etc. (10) By 1896 the Rand trade was 
forced "to pay an additional £2& million in carrying charges to the NZASIT1. (11) 
Nearly all stores, dynamite, machinery, etc., consumed by the mining industry were 
transported to the Rand by the NZASM for at least part of the way; George Albu noted 
that "a merchant once brought me a bill of lading for 190 bags of flour. From 
Bloemfontein to Vaalbridge, a distance of 210 miles, the railway charge is £4.15.6., 
but from Vereeniging to Johannesburg it costs £6.-.-. or 50 per cent dearer at only a 
quarter of the distancet1. (12) In 1895 the mining industry imported material and 
stores to the tune of £1,631,132, which amounted to 25.4 per cent of total working l 
costs, and by 1898 this figure had increased to £2,074,758. (13) Mining supplies were 
the least flexible of the industry's cost components and the NZASM1s tariffs only 
served to frustrate the mining companies' overall attempts at cost minimization. The 
cost of living on the Rand was also forced up by the rai1wa;y company's policies, and 
this in turn necessitated the paying of hi&er wages in the mines, at least for White 
workers. Finally, the NZASM's so-called Rand tram, which linked the collieries of the 
eastern Rand with the main reef, consistently charged high rates for coal frei&ts.(l4) 
In fact, prior to 1894, the NZASM, which owned several coal mines near Springs, 
possessed a coal monopoly by virtue of its persistent refusal to allow other collieries 
to construct branch lines connecting their pitheads with the main Rand tram. 
As coal fomed 10 per cent of total working costs, the NZASM tactics were 
virulently attacked by the Chamber throughout most of the 1890s, especially once some 
mines had been forced to cease production temporarily, owing to the railway company 
being unable to meet their coal and transport requirements. (15) 
Although the NSASM was nominally a Dutch company, its capital and 
considerable financial resources were controlled by a German banking consortium. (16) 
Itoreover, the company's policies were generally thought to be closely allied to those 
of the m r  regime,and, as far as the mining industry was concerned, the activities 
of the SAR and the N W  were so close as to be virtually indistinguishable. (17) 
This attitude towards the NZASM had two important repercussions. Firstly, it 
established in both the public mind and the Colonial Office the belief in a covert 
and allegedly close connection between Pretoria and Gemany. (18) Secondly, it 
reinforced mining capitalts belief, especially after the Industrial Commissionrs 
report of 1897, that the Boer state was incapable of providing the social and economic 
conditions essential to uninterrupted capital accumulation. In this instance the SAR 
merely failed to supply those infrastructural conditions of production, such as an 
efficient and cheap railway and transport system, which capital itself, in the initial 
phase of the process of accumulation, could not provide. 
However, the dynamite monopoly which allegedly cost the industry some 
$2750,000 per m u m  in excess charges (191, was another issue over which mining capital 
and the Boer state clashed. So much so that by 1899 the mining magnates called upon 
the Salisbury administration to pressurize Pretoria and Chamberlain argued that the 
dynamite monopoly was inconsistent with those articles of the London Convention which 
prohibited discrimination of British goods and products. (20) While the industry's 
anxiety was understandable, especially since dynamite formed 8.6 per cent of total 
working costs in 1896, Chamberlain's despatch indicated capitalls ability to mobilize 
the British state now that the SAR had proved to be too intractable. (see Table 111) 
It was the international financial and banking connections of mining capital 
which greatly facilitated access to British government circles, where, in any case, at 
a more social and personal level men like Rhodes and Harris were frequently consulted 
by Colonial Office officials. (21) It was not only the mining industry, however, which 
focused governmental attention on Southern Africa. British commercial-industrial 
capital, particularly elated at the election of Chamberlain in 1895, also vigorously 
lobbied Whitehall about being excluded from the Rand market by the SARls discriminatory 
tariff policies and Germany's aggressive trading practices. (22) Finally, both the 
financially unstable governments of the Cape Colony and Natal spoke of Ehgerls initial 
refusal to allow their railways access to the Rand (23), while the City banking 
fraternity w e d ,  especially after the Baring crisis of 1890, that the continued 
strength of the pound sterling now required a more reliable and expanding supply of 
gold bullion. (24) 
Britain and the Transvaal 
On the whole, the pressures upon the British state during the 1890s can be 
broadly analysed as follows: British capital investment abroad, whether in mining or 
in commerce, was unable to create for itself conditions essential for its own 
! reproduction. In the case of the mining industry this inability was partly due to 
contradictions inherent in its financial structure and composition, and these will be 
discussed below. (25) The Ehgerite regime prevented capital from establishing the 
essential material conditions of production; in particular it failed to regulate and 
I control the conflict between wage-labour and capital as well as effectively to police 
and coerce the labour force generally. 
l Within Britain itself, the continued existence of the state as a particular form of social relations also depended upon the reproduction of capital relations, 
i especially those intimately tied up with foreign trade. This was so because, inter alia, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall forced capital to seek markets abroad; 
-
at the same time, it is the aforementioned tendency, inherent in the contradictions of 
the capitalist mode of production, which in itself constitutes the dynamic force behind 
the process of accumulation and thus the very development of the state itself. Thus, 
when analysing the imperatives and constraints of capital accumulation both on the Rand 
and in Britain, both capital's articulation with the state and the latterrs form become 
apparent. Finally, capital, when trying to reorganize its own relations of production, 
will mobilize the state at various stages during this reorganization from competitive 
capitalism to monopoly capitalism. The particularized form of the state can, therefore, 
1 be derived from an analysis of the particular phase of both capital accumulation and 
the mode of articulation between state and capital. (26) 
British trade with South Africa, and. the Transvaal in particular, had grown 
rapidly after the gold discoveries on the Rand. In 1890 Britain exported £9,819,033 
worth of products to South Africa, and by 1900 this figure had risen to £14,778,017.(27) 
The burgeoning Rand market was becoming crucial to the British econoqy; in September 
1892 the British and South African Export Gazette noted that l 
Board of Trade returns for July show a lamentable falling- 
off in the general foreign demand for British manufmtures. 
The decrease for the month in total exports is £2,481,515, 
about 11 per cent upon 1891, while upon the (piping times' 
of 1890 the decline is £4,857,739, or 25 per cent. These 
sinister statistics are largely due to the exclusion of 
British manufacturers from the Continental and U.S. 
markets by prohibitive hostile tariffs. If the present 
restriction of our trade continues, British politicians 
maJr have to deal with the question of preferential tariffs 
between the Colonies and the Mother Country as a serious 
economic expedient . . . (28) 
Unfortunately, British trade was not only pushed out of the Continental and American 
markets but out of the South African market as well. Again, the British and South 
African mart Gazette claimed that "foreign competition is being increasingly 
formidable; four or five years ago English firms possessed the entire machinery 
trade of South Africa . . . " . (29) Some commercial interests argued that German-owned 
mining houses such as Goerz CO only purchased Geman machinery and deliberately 
refused to buy British. From time to time it was tentatively suggested that British 
marketing techniques as well as the products themselves were not all they were 
generally made out to be (30), but this did not detract from the fact that by the mid- 
1890s there was a widely held view that Britain was being pushed out of the Rand 
markets and that the British government should aid commerce more overtly. That 
Whitehall was not necessarily averse to this had been shown as early as 1888. 
In that year Sir Donald Currie of the Castle Shipping CO had alleged that the 1 
NZASM levied differential duties on British goods. (31) Although Currie's assertions 
were proved to be incorrect, his position as an MP and influential shipping magnate 
forced Whitehall to point out to the SAR the offending articles of the railway companyts 
concession which allowed it to levy customs duties. The SAR was then obliged to force 
the NZASM to agree to another modification of its concession. (32) 
In 1892/3 yet another entrepreneur, Sir  oh' Stokes, managed to enlist the 
Colonial Office's assistance on behalf of his company, Roburite Explosives Ltd. (33) 
The Roburite Company had been exlcuded from the Witwatersrand explosives market by the 
infamous Lippert monopoly and Sir John's lobbying, together with pressure from the 
Nobel ESrplosives CO Ltd of Glasgow, actually obliged Lord Ripon to protest to Pretoria 
about the Lippert scheme. (34) Pretoria promptly capitulated, and between 1893 and 
1894 d;ynamite could be imported more or less freely into the Transvaal under a quota 
system, whereby Genaany, France and Britain were each allocated a percentage of the 
total dynamite trade. (35) \ 
In the autumn of 1893, however, Kkuger decided to set up a new dynamite 
monopoly, and this tine the Anglo-German Nobel Dynamite Trust, of which the Glasgow 
plant was an integral but minor part, managed to obtain it. (36) Whitehall now found 
itself in the embarrassing position of having furthered the cause of Nobelts against 
the interests of the Roburite CO, which was once again excluded from the Rand. The 
company, however, continued to lobby the Colonial Office at least until 1897/8, by 
which time even the British government, under pressure from the mining magnates, had 
come to regret its earlier espousal of Nobells interests. (37) 
The advent of the Salisbury administration in 1895 was greeted favourably 
by those with commercial-industrial interests in South Africa, as Joseph Chamberlain 
was generally held to be someone aware of the problems corlfronting British trade 
overseas. By 1895-6 the USA and Germany had managed partly to exclude Britain from 
the highly lucrative mining machinery market - in 1898, for example, the total value 
of machinery on the mines was £9,409,059. (38) Germaay had also managed to corner 
the listing and electrical equipment market, albeit in this instance with considerable 
aid from the SARfs own public works programme, which placed contracts solely with 
German companies. (39) Nevertheless, during the period 1895/8 German economic 
penetration of the Transvaal was regarded as part and parcel of that countryfs 
nefarious expansionist schemes in Southern Africa generally. The Colonial Office 
became obsessed with amything German south of the Limpopo, and the governments of both 
the Cape Colony and Natal, as well as the British Consul at Lourengo Marques, were 
instructed to note caref'ully the arrival and numbers of German nationals, ships, 'etc., 
calling at their respective ports. (40) 
Chamberlain was infuriated at Berlinfs overt assistance to German commerce; 
rumours of a subsidised shipping line between Hamburg and Delagoa Bay (which later 
proved to be substantially correct) were "evidence of deliberate hostility to British 
trade. It may not be surprising and it is not a fcasw bellif but it is useless to 
shut our eyes to it . . .I1 (41) The attitude of Berlin only exacerbated suspicion of 
Germany's intentions in the Transvaal; in 1896 the Emperor informed Sir Frank 
Lascelles, the British Ambassador in Berlin, of the vast commercial interests of 
Gemany in the Transvaal (42), while the German Foreign Minister, Marschall von 
Bieberstein, found it necessary to point out that "the railway from Pretoria to the 
Portuguese frontier had been built almost entirely with German capital. There was a 
feeling that the commercial interests of Germany had not been sufficiently protected 
by the government . . . (43) 
Both Buger and Leyds made the most of these economic interests by attempting 
to involve Gemany politically as well in their country's relations with Britain. 
Chamberlain and his predecessor, Lord Ripon, had been aware of Ihger's crude 
flirtations with Berlin and attempted to limit the SARfs political manoeuvrability by 
stressing the rights of Uitlanders, suzerainty, etc., and thus simultaneously 
establishing in front of a wider international audience Britain's claims in Southern 
Africa as a whole. 
Considerations of political hegemony were strengthened and mutually 
reinforced by demands placed upon Whitehall by commercial-industrial interests unable 
to secure from the SAR the necessary conditions and co-operation essential if their 
penetration of the Rand market was to remain successful. Already constrained by 
aggressive trading practices of Germany, the USA, France, etc., on the Continent and 
elsewhere, British commercial-industrial interests now,dso discovered that the worldfs 
fastest growing market in large machinery boilers, hoists, etc., was becoming 
increasingly competitive and that, in addition, the government there was hostile to 
their influence and expansion. (44) It was no surprise, therefore, that soon after 
the commencement of the war Chamberlain could enthuse in a meeting of the Imperial 
institute about the future of British trade in South Africa: 
there will be great numbers going to develop not only 
the mineral resources of this country which have 
already been opened up, but those still greater 
resources which we know to exist. In every kind of 
business occupation - manufacturing, industrial, 
mining - there must of necessity be great development 
and this country will be drawn upon for the majority ... 
of those who will carry out that development . . . (45) 
1 
However, the dilemmas of continued capital accumulation affected not only 
commercial-industrial investment on the Rand. In 1895 the mining industry tried to 
establish a more amenable administration by organizing and financing the Jameson Raid. 
Both Blainey and Mendelsohn have noted that the imperatives of deep level mining, in 
particular, were such that if long~tem capital investment was to be at all justified 
uncertainties about supplies of African labour, "bewaarplaat~en'~, Gold Law, etc., had 
to be removed. (46) While the validity of their assertions is beyond doubt, a more 
detailed analysis of the constraints and imperatives of the relations of production 
within mining is required in order to consider the relations between state and mining 
capital. The structure and form of capital accumulation,which depends on the relations 
of production, are crucial here. 
Mining capital had to deal with unusual geological formations of the gold- 
bearing reef, shortages of labour, etc. In addition, however, certain mining groups 
such as Wernher, Beit and Consolidated Gold Fields had a financial structure which 
by its very nature, encouraged a high and speculative market valuation of their shares. 
In 1896 Wernher, Beit's holdings were valued at 50 per cent of total market value of 
listed Rand mining shares, and between 1887 and 1895 the company1s 10 outcrop mines 
produced gold valued at £7,780,861, which was just short of 32 per cent of the total 
gold production for that period. (47) 
Yet, in order to raise new working capital, new companies had to be floated 
and additional shares placed on the market. Periodic booms and depressions like 
those of 1895 and 1897/8 had made the investing public weary of "kaffirs", more so 
because many of the spectacular downturns had been due to over-capitalization, 
straightforward speculation and excessive initial exp~nditure. 
The Economist was particularly scathing of the Rand's financial dealings; 
in December 1897 it took Wernher, Beit to twk about its heavy capital outlay and 
its non-existent profits in deep level mining. (48) Short-term profit maximization 
was therefore essential, if only to pay out dividends and satisfy shareholders. In 
fact, Consolidated Gold Fields had a more novel, if unorthodox, method in dealing with 
dividends and the Economist1 S exhortations for profits ; in 1894/6 the company 
simply paid awaJr large sums in dividends, despite management's awareness that the 
"profits" during the financial year came mainly from the once-off realization of assets 
and that more concrete profits would only ever be available for distribution when the 
deep levels came into full production. (49) 
On the whole, however, these companies had to work under constraints 
inherent in their financial structure: short-term profit maximization was needed to 
create new working capital and to pay out dividends, thus raising the companyts 
speculative appeal, enabling it to raise yet further working capital by share issues 
and debenture loans. New working capital was particularly crucial if the deep levels 
were to be developed at all, thou&, admittedly, some of the capital for those 
ventures was raised, in the case of Wernher, Beit and Rand Mines Ltd, by the 
selling of outcrop mines between 1894 and 1895. (50) Furthermore, profit maximization 
entailed the coercive exploitation of the labour force, together with continual 
overall cost minimization and, the creation of a polity willing to assist in the control 
of capital-labour relations. 
Finally, Wernher, Beit had issued a large proportion of their original 
shares in companies such as Rand Mines Ltd at or below par to either the vendors 
themselves or their friends. The partners themselves also held the so-called 
'lfounders lieun (as did Rhodes and Rudd in Consolidated Gold ~ields), which entitled 
them to an additional share of the gross profits, should these rise above a certain 
predetermined percentage of dividend on capital issued. The main problem, however, 
with financial quirks such as the retention of much share capital at pax by the 
original vendors was the creation of a highly leveraged capital structure with little 
mobile shslre capital, giving large profits to the privileged few and relatively meagre 
profits to the remaining many. (51) The immobility of share capital in this case made 
it all the more vital that capital invested within the company's structure should be 
utilized to its very utmost. This further enhanced the assertion that in those mining 
companies labouring under the above-mentioned constraints, a greater need existed to 
extract maximum surplus labour, manipulate the local state, and even call upon another 
polity for assistance in re-establishing conducive social formations and. relations of 
production. 
That the form of capital accumulation and the particular structure of the 
mining company indirectly associated with it can throw further light on state-capital 
relations is borne out, in part, when one looks at Adolf Goew Ltd and General Mining 
and Finance CO Ltd. By 1895 both mining houses were closely associated with, 
respectively, the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdener Bank. (52) These "Grossbankenll were 
manifestations of a distinct phase in the capitalist relations of production in 
Germany, which corresponded to, and was closely associated with, the growth of monopoly 
capitalism. In Germany, monopoly capital was a merger between industrial-productive 
capital and centralized money capital (banking capital). Both Lenin and Hilferding 
have charted the growth of monopoly capital in Germany, and it will therefore suffice 
at this juncture merely to note that from about the late 1870s the reproduction of 
productive capital was dominated and controlled by banking capital. (53) The 
centralization of credit and the monopolization of productive capital had also taken 
place under the benign aegis of the Bismarckian state, itself a concomitant social 
formation of this process. By the 1880s, however, continued capital accumulation and 
l 
l the need to stave off the falling rate of profit had exceeded in part the limits of the internal market, and this had forced German capital to seek investment outlets 
, abroad. (54) The Bismarckian state encouraged this trend, partly to ensure 
reproduction of total social capital and also because, in the absence of any 
I government-controlled institution through which national financial policies could be 
i initiated in order to influence the economy, the only remaining field of action by which Berlin could hope to control and regulate economic growth and pursue anti- 
l 
I cyclical policies was that of foreign trade. 
The rapidly expanding mining ventures of A. Goem Ltd and General Mining, 
etc., were the result of the German state's interventionist direction of overseas 
capital investment. As early as 1886, the close links between banking capital, through 
which all German foreign investment was channelled, and the state were illustrated 
when Berlin vetoed the Disconto Gesellschaft~s involvement with the NZASM. (55) When 
the railway company did eventually obtain financial assistance from another G e m  
bank, the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, the German consul in Pretoria informed 
Chancellor Caprivi that "it must never happen again that German capital is being used 
for an operation which is largely run by Dutchmen .l1 (56) 
In 1891 the Nationale Bank der Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek Beperkt was 
formed, with the aid of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft and the very active patronage 
of the German government which had, at first, vetoed the scheme but later advised the 
Handelsgesellschaft to participate. (57) The Nationale Bank's close links with German 
capital were further illustrated by the fact that its agent in London was the local 
representative of the Deutsche Bank. 
The close links between German monopoly capital and Goerz and General 
Mining cushioned both companies against unwarranted shortages of working capital, which 
had plagued some of the other mining groups. The llcorporate" nature of these links 
was further illustrated by the fact that both companies tended to purchase their stores 
arnd machinery in Germany from factories owned by the llGrossbankenll (58); the latest 
scientific techniques, such as the Siemens-Halske process for ore extraction (siemens 
A.G. was financed by the Deutsche Bank, and its director, Georg Siemens, was a cousin 
of Adolf ~oerz), and management skills could be appropriated through the connections 
and financial largesse inherent in both the 'lcorporatem structure and the international 
capital connections of these mining companies. The link between monopoly capital and 
the mining houses,on the one hand, and between monopoly capital and the German state, 
on the other hand, allowed the mining houses generous access to the corridors of power 
in Berlin. \ 
By 1898/9 this became vital in moulding Germany's attitude towards Britain's 
imperialist intentions in Southern Africa; by then, even the German mining companies 
had concluded that if deep level mining, with its crucial economies of scale, high 
cost structure, etc., was going to be profitable the Kruger regime would have to go. 
This was the substance of a letter by Goerz to the German Foreign Ministry in 1897. (59) 
Dusing the same year the mining houses and a number of German commercial interests on 
the Rand first voiced their collective displeasure with the Kruger regime and the 
findings of the Industrial Commission. (60) Some 500 million marks of German capital 
had been invested on the Rand (61) and, while at least until 1897 the NZASM had been 
regarded in some German circles as the prime example of their country's investment in 
the SAR, by 1898 German mining interests had clearly become dominant. The Anglo-German 
agreement of 1898 (62), therefore, merely reinforced on a political level the general 
tenor of mining capital's message to Berlin, namely the advent of British rule in the 
Transvaal would not necessarily be unwelcome to German economic interests. 
Firlally, the British government's attitude towards the Transvaal was not 
just influenced by the need to ensure the unintermpted reproduction of total social 
capital abroad, but was also fuelled by a persistent clamour on behalf of the British 
banking comrrmnity for more gold bullion. (63) The call for more gold specie as an 
underpinning of Britain's dischaxgeable liabilities and debts had been pushed to the 
centre of the economic stage by %he Baring Crisis of 1890. The spectacular defaulting 
of Baring Bros, which at one stage had been the second most powerful financial 
institution in Britain after the Bank of England, had severely shaken the City, and 
throughout the remainder of the decade successive Chancellors of the Ekchequer, as well 
as the well respected Bankers Magazine, called for "a separate stock of gold with which 
in times of emergency the Bank of -land would be able to come to the rescue of the 
mercantile community generally". (64) 
Baring Bros had collapsed because it had been unable, in a time of impending 
financial crisis in Argentina, to liquidate its assets quickly enough in order to meet 
immediate liabilities. The main problem, which affected most banks though, ironically 
enough, not Barings, was the huge discrepancy between liabilities and assets; this 
was particularly crucial as, between 1879 and 1889, the liabilities of all the largest 
banks had increased from £126 million to £170 million, while cash balances in the 
hands of the Bank of England had only increased by £1,300,000 from £16,300,000 (1879) 
to £17,500,000 (1889). (65) 
The proportion of cash to liabilities had fallen during these same ten years 
from a ratio of 12.9 to 10.3 - a fall in proportion of one-fifth on the whole reserve - 
and the Bank clearly no longer commanded the same proportionate resources as it had 
previously. G. J. Goschen, the Chancellor of the &chequer, was quick to articulate 
the fears and perceived needs of the banking fraternity, while he noted, correctly, 
that Itwe are not only faced by a banking danger. The mercantile and producing classes 
were threatened as well . . .11(66) Be %hen stated: 
now, clearly what is necessary to get men out of a 
difficulty when they have undertaken more liabilities 
than they can meet, is to have cash. It is cash that 
is wanted. In the case of foreign liabilities ... 
bank-notes are of no sufficient avail. What you need 
is gold which will pay your liabilities in foreign 
countries. (67) 
Any noticeable increase in the Bank of England's stock of gold was constrained by the 
fact that total world output of gold had been declining steadily,at least until the 
discoveries on the Rand. (68) men with the Rand's contribution of new gold, general 
monetary instability continued throughout the 1890s, with the bimetallic debate raging 
- - 
as fiercely as ever both in England and, more importantly, in the USA at least until 
1896. (69) 
In 1897 the Bank of England was confronted with the question whether Japan, 
which had just adopted the gold standard, was likely to withdraw its huge deposits of 
bullion from the Bank. (70) Throughout this period,also, the demand for the gold 
standard in India was increasing, so that by 1899 The Statist argued that "our money 
market will be seriously disturbed if India begins to accumulate a considerable gold 
reserve . . .l1. (71) 
In the same year the Bankers Magazine noted that "there has been a special 
feature in the gold market during the last few years of purchases of the metal on 
Russian account which cannot be considered otherwise than exceptional and 
extraordinary". (72) It was not surprising, therefore, that in the months leading up 
to the Boer War the Cityts clamour for gold had reached cacophonic proportions, which 
reached their crescendo in June with Hicks Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
again calling for a second reserve of gold. (73) 
Milner, himself a disciple and assistant to Goschen in the 1880s, cannot 
have been mware of the economic implications of a British Rand for Britain's gold 
reserves; once the war had broken out, however, it was left to the Bankers Magazine 
to state that !!the war had been estimated at its true value by all other nationst1, to 
which the half-yearly report of the Union Bank of London merely added l". exceptionally 
peaceful relations existed between Britain and the other industrial powers in the 
World . . . l?. (74) 
During the Anglo-Boer war Milner continuously stressed the need for close 
co-operation and consultation between mining capital and the British state. (75) He 
was particularly keen that the mineowners should be allowed to combine further to 
depress wages; the governmentts role in this would be merely to assist and enforce 
the mining industry's labour needs to the full. In 1902, for example, Milner was 
quick to accede to the Chamberls requests not to make the new Gold Law retrospective 
and to allow the mining companies to deduct war costs from the next year's tax 
liabilities. Indeed, the Transvaalts new Colonial Secretary and member of Milnerts 
Kindergarten, Patrick Duncan, who had previously lowered the controversial duty on 
imported dynamite, noted that "whatever stimulates the mining industry is an indirect 
benefit to the general community11. (76) 
While the Milner administrationls commitment to the mining industry was 
total and unswerving, Whitehall had nevertheless decided that the Transvaal should 
pay a war tribute in return for its liberation from the Boer oligarchs. In January 
1903 Chamberlain visited the Rand and, following lengthy conversations with assorted 
mining magmtes, it was agreed that a war tribute should be paid in three separate 
instalments of £10,000,000 each. These instalments would be paid by the floating of 
local Transvaal loans at 4 per cent and could be subscribed only by the mining 
companies. (77) 
Apparently, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was m a s t  at Chamberlain's 
munificence; these loam would be essentially gilt-edged, and at 4 per cent they 
would be an extremely profitable investment. The most revealing comment on 
Chamberlainls negotiations with the mining magnates, however, came from Drummond 
Chaplin of Consolidated Gold Fields. He argued that the loans would be a safe and 
very valuable means of investing surplus capital profitably, which implied that, in 
1903, after several years of severely restricted or interrupted mining, South Africa's 
second largest mining company in terms of capital expended evidently possessed enough 
l?excessll uninvested capital. (78) However, this does not deny that by 1903 the 
mining industry was also operating under severe constraints. Rapidly rising costs, 
of which the problems of labour supply played a major but not exclusive p&, as well 
as a general downward movement in the average grade of'gold, severely limited the 
mining industryls financial flexibility. The demand for Chinese labour was the 
direct result of trying to minimize labour costs by stabilizing at least part of the 
labour force on the deep level mines in particular. (79) Nevertheless, Chaplints 
remarks on the apparent availability of surplus capital, even though most of that must 
have been absorbed in the years thereafter by rising costs, etc., were indicative of a 
change in the financial structure of mining which became more pronounced only after 
1905/6 
As early as 1896, in the gloomy aftermath of the llkaffir boom" of the 
previous year, Wernher, Beit had induced the Banque Frangaise de 1tAfrique du Sud 
to take up and promote their shares on the French exchanges. By 1899 half of the 
Bank1s assets of 17,500,000 francs was in mining shares or debentures. (80) Wernher 
even noted in 1899 that "in another two years the bulk of the best shares will be in 
France . . .l1. (81) Some four years later, in 1903, Wernher, Beit set up African 
Ventures Syndicate "with a view of steadying the market and regaining the confidence 
of the Transvaal minea . . .l1. (82) German and French banks were allocated 1034 shares 
out of a total of 2000. In 1905, however, African Ventures was absorbed by General 
Mining and Investment CO Ltd; here, however, the German and French banks were less 
predominating as the llcorporate" structure was more broadly based. (83) 
It was during this period that the mining industry generally was also moving 
into secondary industry, such as mining machinery manufacture, dynamite, etc. In 1905, 
for example, de Beers Consolidated Mines and Consolidated Gold Fields set up a 
separate dynamite company, The Cape Explosives Works, which had been manufacturing 
dynamite at Somerset West since early 1903 and which now closely co-operated with the 
British South African Explosives CO Ltd of Modderfontein in the Transvaal. (84) The 
latter company, of course, was the reconstituted heir of the old SAR dynamite monopoly. 
The move into ancillary and secondary industries by the mining houses was 
symptomatic of a new phase in their financial and structural development. It 
corresponded in part to the earlier growth of monopoly capital in Germany in that 
investment companies or trusts, with their concentrated economic ownership, controlled 
several diversified production units. This allowed the investment company to raise 
new working capital within the perimeters of its own structure. In 1906 
forty-one of the largest mining companies paid out £5,200,000 in dividends to holders 
of £22,500,000 worth of issued share capital of which, in turn, an astonishing 
£16,000,000 was in the form of vendors' shares. A further 37 mines in the development 
stage only had issued £17,500,000 in share capital, of which £11,000,000 had been taken 
up by the vendors themselves. (85) In other words, the structural problems of little 
mobile share capital discussed earlier in this paper remained, unless the mining 
industry, with its diversified investments in secondary and ancillary industries, was 
able to raise sufficient additional working capital within the new "corporate" 
structure. This had the distinct advantage that any financial dependence upon either 
the mercurial vagaries of the stock-holding public or the strings of financial 
institutions like the banks could be minimized; the pressure to maximize short-term 
profits, if only to pa~r out dividends, was also lessened. That a broadly based 
structure, incorporating various units of production, was economically sound, was 
illustrated by the development of the financial and productive units of the Wernher, 
Beit group of companies. In 1910, H. Eckstein CO, together with Wernher, Beit, were 
absorbed by Central Mining and Investment CO Ltd, which by then had branched into coal 
mining, machinery workshops, etc. (86) 
Throughout the period after l9OO mining capital co-operated closely with 
the state, if only because in order to extract maximum surplus labour extra-economic 
and coercive measures were needed, which could only really be enforced with the aid 
of the state. The importation of Chinese labour, in particular, was done, initially 
at least, with the enthusiastic backing of the government; the state had to be 
mobilized by capital in order to mould and reconstitute its relations of production. 
Moreover, as the state reacts to the imperatives of the process of production 
and reproduction (as a form it is separated from the actual and immediate process of 
production), the Milnerite regime was only able to create the necessary social 
formations and infrastructural conditions for uninterrupted reproduction of capital; 
in this analysis the advent of self-government in the ~ransvaal and the subsequent 
political domination of Het Volk did not signal the demise of Milnerism as a 
particularized form of appasent state obeisance to capital, but its crowning success. 
By 1907, the Afrikaner bourgeoisie had been successfully co-opted by mining capital, 
welding the landed interests of the former to the framework of the state, which state- 
capital articulation had created in order to ensure continued accumulation. The Botha- 
Smuts administration1s behaviour during the 1907 strike aptly illustrated this. 
The development of the function and the form of the state, both in 1907 and 
after 1910, was the result of the historical development and structure of the process 
of accumulation; after the war, the mining industry needed the British state, 
committed as it was to a kind of global management of its economic interests, to 
reconstitute its relations of production and to allow it (capital) to restructure its 
financial operations generally. By 1910 mining capital had become more broadly based, 
financially secure and able to exert additional domestic economic pressure. Its 
imperatives, however, had become correspondingly more demanding, with South African 
Railways and Harbours Board, a unified tariff Structure, and more total control over 
supplies of African labour from all over Southern Africa, etc. As such, a more unified 
and administratively better organized polity - the Union - was required. (87) Again, 
the form of the state was derived from the more demanding and enlarged relations of 
production (the different units of production within the new llcorporatetl structure were, 
of course, exhibiting autonomous and even contradictory labour processes), which, in 
time, would call for yet more coercion and control by the state,and as such the stage 
for closer state-capital articulation was set. 
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Table 1 
The Output of Transvaal Gold Mines as Proportion of the Total World Output 1886-1905 
Year World Output ( f ine ozs) Transvaal Output ( f ine ozs) $ of World Output 
-
l Source: Union of South Africa, Annual Report of the Transvaal Government Mining 
Engineer f o r  the Year Ending 30th June 1910. 
Table I1 
The following tables (A and B) show the Increase of Geman Trade and the _Relative 
I 
j Decline of Br i t i sh  Trade w i t h  South Africa i n  the 1890s. 
1892 (g) lsgg (E) (E) 
German-South African trade (incl.  the SAR) 662,665 828,617 1,0549226 
G ~ ~ ~ Z I - S A R  trade 94 , 086 194, €310 339,452 
l SAR-Geman trade percentage t o  t o t a l  German- 
South African trade 14 23.5 32 
l 
, Source: Br i t i sh  and South African Ekport Gazette, April 1898, May 1896. 
Br i t i sh  trade with South Africa ( incl .  the 1 
l SA. 8,819,033 12,2159907 14,778,017 
l ~ 
Percentage t o  t o t a l  imports 00.3 75.9 64.05 l 
1 Foreign trade with South Africa, e.g. 
Germany, France, USA, Belgium, Holland 654,455 2 , 188 , 247 3,668,087 
Percentage t o  t o t a l  imports 
Source: Bri t ish South African mart Gazette, June 1901. 
Table I11 
A Selected Extract of an Analysis of Workiw Costs fo r  the Whole Rand from the Mining 
EnRineerrs Report, 1895. 
White Labour 
African Labour 2,000,000 28.6 
Coal 700,000 10.0 
Ekplosives (Dynamite, ~ e l a t i n e )  600,000 8.6 
Cyanide 
Remainder (i.e. food, tools, s tee l ,  
cement, etc.) 
Source: hridence and Report of the Industrial Connnission of Enquiry (~ohannesburg, 
l879), 200. 
